Surge Pricing, Asymmetrical Power, and Consumer Protection

Assessing Fairness in Digital Transportation Contracts

Abstract

Surge pricing in digital transportation services raises questions of contractual fairness because platforms control price-formation mechanisms, transaction data, and standard contractual terms, whereas consumers primarily encounter prices generated by automated systems. This study examines how asymmetrical power manifests in the implementation of surge pricing and evaluates the adequacy of Indonesia’s consumer protection framework in safeguarding contractual fairness. Using a normative-empirical (socio-legal) design, the study combines statutory and conceptual analysis with a survey of 113 online transportation service users selected through purposive sampling. Survey data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, the Shapiro–Wilk test, Spearman’s rank correlation, and, as a supplementary analysis, ordinal logistic regression. Legal materials were analyzed qualitatively and prescriptively and then integrated with the empirical findings. The results show that perceived transparency of fare information was relatively low (M = 2.09), whereas understanding of dynamic pricing was higher (M = 3.17). Experience of fare changes was significantly associated with their reported effect on service-use decisions (ρ = 0.582; p < 0.001) and with perceptions of disadvantage (ρ = 0.347; p < 0.001). These findings indicate that asymmetrical power extends beyond informational inequality to encompass platform control over price-formation mechanisms and the practical effectiveness of consumer choice. Although Indonesia’s legal framework contains substantive consumer-protection safeguards, it lacks sufficiently specific parameters for assessing real-time dynamic pricing. The study therefore proposes three analytical parameters—information adequacy, meaningful consent, and protection against situational vulnerability—as a basis for evaluating contractual fairness in surge-pricing practices.